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We investigate the impact of merger on innovation and efficiency using a 
micro dataset of Japanese manufacturing firms including unlisted firms during the 
period of 1995-1999. We find that the acquirer’s total factor productivity (TFP) 
decreases immediately after mergers and does not significantly recover to the 
pre-merger level within three years after mergers. We also find that the R&D 
intensity does not significantly change after mergers in spite of a significant 
increase in the debt-to-asset ratio. Our results suggest that the costs of business 
integration are large and persistent.   
To take into considering large integration costs, we also analyze the 
post-merger performance from one year after mergers, finding no significant 
increase in TFP or R&D intensity up to three years after mergers.   
Given the heterogeneity of mergers, we analyze the post-merger performance 
by classifying merger types. We find that the recovery of TFP after mergers is 
significant for mergers across industries or within the same business group, 
suggesting that a synergy effect works well and integration costs are small for those 
types of mergers   
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Mergers and Innovation: Evidence from Japanese Manufacturing Firms 
 
1.  Introduction 
There was a large wave of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in Japan for more 
than a decade from 1996. The number of M&As in which Japanese firms were 
acquired by either domestic or foreign firms was 220 on average during the period of 
1985-1995, jumped to 616 in 1996, then increased steadily, reaching the peak of 
2738 in 2007. Although such a rising trend stopped in 2008, when the world-wide 
financial crisis hit the Japanese economy, there are continued interests in the 
consequences of M&As. Do they improve the reallocation of capital in the sense that 
less efficient firms are taken over and improved by more efficient firms? From the 
viewpoint of a longer horizon, do M&As promote or inhibit innovative activities and 
how do they affect the productivity growth? These questions are of great importance 
to understand the role of mergers in the reallocation of capital in a macroeconomy.  
They also have implications to competition policy and hence gained attention of 
both economists and regulators (e.g., FTC, 1996). 
The U.S. and European merger waves in the 1980s and 1990s have attracted 
many researchers’ attention. Hall (1999) surveys literature examining the effects of 
corporate mergers and restructuring on productivity and technical change and 
summarizes that these transactions were followed by productivity improvements in 
firms involved. However, despite a growing concern about the consequences of 
M&As in Japan, literature on Japanese M&As is still scarce. Though some 
preceding studies focus on the recent Japanese M&A wave and find evidences that 
are consistent with the role of M&As as capital reallocation (e.g., Arikawa and 
Miyajima, 2006), they do not focus on the dynamic aspects of M&As through their 
impact on the firms’ innovative activity. We focus on Japanese manufacturing firms 
and investigate the impact of mergers on the acquiring firm’s R&D intensity and 
productivity. Given the heterogeneity of mergers, it is of great importance to take 
into consideration the possibility that different types of mergers have different 
impacts on innovation and productivity. Specifically, we examine whether mergers 
within an industry have different impacts from mergers across industries. In 
addition, we investigate the possibility that mergers undertaken within a business 
group may have different impacts from the others. Some preceding studies on 
mergers in Japan find competing results on the role of a business group in 
improving the efficiency of mergers (Yeh and Hoshino, 2002; Iwaki 2007).   3 
 
The rest of this paper consists of six sections. In Section 2, we present some 
hypotheses on the motives of mergers and their consequences on the innovative 
activity and productivity. In Section 3, we review some related literature. Section 4 
describes our dataset. In Sections 5 and 6, we present our empirical results for the 
motives of acquiring firms and consequences on their R&D intensity and 
productivity, respectively. In Section 7, we present evidences on how the pre-merger 
characteristics of acquires are related to the post-merger performance. Section 8 
concludes. 
    
2.  Hypotheses 
A.  Value Creation 
More productive firms acquire less productive firms to increase their profits by 
extending their superior technology or managerial skills to the acquired assets 
(Maksimovic and Phillips, 2002; Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2004). Though the profit 
maximization motive suggests that the productivity of the acquired assets increases 
after mergers, it is not clear whether the acquirers increase productivity. If there is 
some scale or scope economy or synergy effects, the acquirer’s productivity increases. 
On the other hand, managers may find it more difficult to manage a large firm than 
a small firm. In particular, if acquisitions of inefficient plants require substantial 
management costs of integrating business, the acquirer’s’ productivity decreases. 
The impact of mergers on R&D depends on technological aspects of acquired 
assets. When mergers occur among firms that focus on the same or substitutable 
technological areas, acquirers tend to reduce R&D activities to avoid the duplication 
with acquired firms. In this case, the acquirer’s low R&D does not result in low 
productivity. On the other hand, when mergers occur among firms who operate in 
complementary technological areas, acquirers tend to increase R&D to take 
advantage of the synergy effects associated with mergers.   
  
B.  Conflicts of Interest between Managers and Shareholders 
Takeover decisions may be influenced by conflicts of interest between managers 
and shareholders. Self-interested managers may undertake acquisitions for 
empire-building or managerial entrenchment (e.g., Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 
1990). 
 This view suggests that mergers tend to occur in matured or shrinking firms 
that have excess cash flow and in industries where returns to investment projects 
are low (Jensen, 1986). In this case, no efficiency gains are realized by mergers.   4 
 
If managers enjoy private benefits from R&D projects, they may increase R&D 
after they have established an empire through mergers. On the other hand, if 
mergers substantially increase acquires’ indebtedness and probability of bankruptcy, 
managers will reduce spending on unprofitable R&D projects to avoid bankruptcy 
and maintain their positions (Hart and Moore, 1995). If such a disciplinary role of 
debt works effectively, the acquiring firm that used to be run inefficiently by 
privately-motivated managers improves efficiency after mergers. 
 
C.  External Finance Constraints 
Mergers often increase acquirers’ leverage and reduce their cash holdings. If 
acquirers cannot obtain sources of financing new R&D projects or have to pay high 
external financing costs due to some financial market frictions, they have to give up 
their profitable R&D projects. Examples of financial market frictions are debt 
overhang due to asymmetric information and myopic markets that do not value 
long-term investment like R&D (Myers, 1977). In this case, acquirers will reduce 
productivity due to low R&D intensity. 
  The above hypotheses are summarized in Table 1. 
 
3.  Literature 
Many preceding studies obtained evidences supporting the value creation 
hypothesis. Maksimovic and Philips (2001) examined the market for corporate 
assets, i.e., partial asset sales and mergers, using the U.S. plant-level data for 
manufacturing plants, and found that most transactions result in productivity gains 
for the transferred asset, which is consistent with the profit-maximizing behavior. 
Lichtenberg and Siegel (1987) find that plants changing owners had higher 
productivity growth than that plants that did not change owners. Lang, Stultz and 
Walking (2002) show that the total stock market gains in tender offers are highest 
when the bidder has a high Tobin’s q and the target has a low q. This is also 
consistent with the value creation hypothesis. Servases (1991) obtained similar 
results. Hall (1999) used the data of U.S. publicly traded manufacturing firms 
during the period of 1976 to 1995 and found that R&D intensities and TFP 
increased for the firms with a high probability of merging (i.e., with a large size, a 
low R&D intensity, a high Tobin’s Q, and more cash flow).   
There is also some evidence for self-interested managers’ motive for mergers. 
Mock, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) find evidence that the stock market reacts 
negatively to diversifying acquisitions and to acquisitions where the acquirers 5 
 
perform poorly prior to the acquisitions. Maksimovic and Philips (2001) found that 
firm productivity declines in the case of mergers by acquirers with lower 
productivity than that of the assets they purchase, which is consistent with the 
self-interested managerial behavior. McGuckin and Ngyen (1995) and Schoar (2000) 
also find that the productivity of acquiring firms’ plants falls and that the 
productivity of the targets’ plants rises following a takeover. 
For financial constraint effects, Hall (1999) finds that R&D was frequently 
reduced following a major increase in debt levels, whether or not accompanied by 
mergers. 
Literature on the impacts of mergers of Japanese firms on R&D and productivity 
is scarce. Yeh and Hoshino (2002) examined 86 Japanese mergers completed from 
1970 to 1994 and found that acquirers did not improve total factor productivity but 
deteriorated profitability. Fukao et al. (2006) analyze the post-acquisition 
performance of the acquired Japanese firms and find that those firms acquired by 
foreign firms improve TFP and labor productivity while those acquired by domestic 
firms do not. Iwaki (2006) analyzes mergers and acquisitions by Japanese 
publicly-listed firms completed from 1980 to 2004１  and finds that mergers increase 
labor productivity and that the positive effect of mergers is stronger for 
within-group mergers than others. However, she does not distinguish acquirers 
from targets. None of these preceding studies control for the endogeneity of mergers 
in selecting control samples with which acquiring or acquired firms are to be 
compared.  
Concerning the role of a business group in Japan, there are competing 
evidences. Some suggest that a close relationship within a business group worsens 
the conflicts of interests between managers and shareholders by strengthening the 
managerial entrenchment. Yeh and Hoshino (2002) found that mergers by firms 
within the same Japanese business group, keiretsu, worsened the acquiring firm’s 
profitability, suggesting that mergers within a keiretsu were often conducted for the 
purpose of bailing a financially distressed affiliated firm. Others suggest that a 
close relationship within a business group help mitigate the information problem 
and create higher value through mergers. Iwaki (2006) found that mergers within a 
business group tend to increase labor productivity and ROA, suggesting that 
pre-merger information sharing through the dispatch of directors from the parent 
company to its subsidiary and clear power balance between the acquiring and 
acquired firms within the business group help improve post-merger efficiency. 
 6 
 
4.  Data 
We focus on manufacturing firms by matching firms contained in Basic Survey 
of Japanese Business Structure and Activities (BSJBSA) and firms in MARR M&A 
Data published by RECOF. 
BSJBSA covers all the firms with 50 or more employees and with 30 million 
yens or more of equity capital belonging to mining, manufacturing and 
nonmanufacturing industries except for finance and some other service industries. 
The number of sample firms amounts to about 30 thousand each year. BSJBSA 
contains information on key financial indicators, research and development 
expenditures, and other detailed information on business activities. MARR M&A 
Data contains mergers and acquisitions (M&As) involving Japanese firms, dates on 
which M&A information was released, M&A type (mergers, acquisitions, transfer of 
business, increase in capital investment, and others), industries and nationalities of 
firms involved, and information on whether M&As were undertaken within the 
same business group or not. 
Our dataset covers mergers completed from fiscal year 1995 to fiscal year 1999. 
The beginning year is determined considering that BSJBSA has been published 
annually since 1994 and that we use one-year pre-merger characteristics of firms. 
The ending year is set so that we use BSJBS of fiscal year 2002 and examine 
post-merger performance up to three years after mergers. 
We could match BSJBSA and MARR for 141 mergers for which acquirers’ data 
were available for one year before mergers and three years after mergers. On the 
other hand, the number of acquired firms for which we could match BSJBSA and 
MARR was as small as 55. Consequently, we focus only on the acquiring firms in 
this paper. 
Tables 2A and 2B show the numbers of mergers by year and by industry, 
respectively. Table 2C classifies merger types into four. Theoretically, mergers can 
be classified into horizontal, vertical, and diversifying ones. Unfortunately, we 
cannot distinguish the vertical and diversifying mergers given that only the 
industries of the acquiring and acquired firms are available. Mergers in which 
acquiring and acquired firms belong to the same industry are classified as 
within-industry mergers and others as across-industry mergers here. Using the 
industry classification adopted by RECOF (40 industries), we find that 56 percent of 
mergers occurred within the same industry. We also classify mergers according to 
whether they are within the same business group or not. We define the 
within-group merger, following the definition of RECOF, as merger between a 7 
 
parent company and its subsidiary or between the largest shareholder and its 
related companies.1 We find that 91 percent of mergers occurred within the same 
business  group.   
 
5.  Acquirers’ Pre-merger Characteristics 
Though we are mainly interested in the post-merger performance, we 
investigate the pre-merger characteristics of acquirers in this section. A main 
purpose of this analysis is to obtain a suitable control group to be compared with 
acquirers, which we use in the following sections. It will also be useful to examine 
the validity of the hypotheses presented in section Section2. Specifically, we perform 
the following logistic regression: 
t i t i
t i
t i Year Industry X
p
p













ln β                                  ( 1 ) ,       
where  t i p ,  is the probability of a firm i’’s being an acquirer in year t.  1 , − t i X  is a 
vector of the firm i’’s characteristics in year t-1. We add industry and year dummies. 
As the firm characteristics, we choose TFP, R&D expenditures as a proportion of 
sales (R&D intensity, hereafter), cash flow-to-asset ratio, logarithm of total assets, 
logarithm of firm age, cost-to-asset ratio, and debt-to-asset ratio. The sample firms 
are all manufacturing firms compiled in BSJBSA. 
   Table 3 shows the estimation result. The coefficient on TFP is positive and 
significant at the 10 percent level, which is consistent with the value-creating 
hypothesis. On the other hand, the cost ratio has a positive and significant 
coefficient, which is not consistent with the hypothesis that efficient firms are more 
likely to merger inefficient firms. The coefficient on cash flow is negative and 
significant, which is not consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis (Jensen, 1986) 
or the financial constraint hypothesis. The coefficient on the R&D intensity and the 
debt-to-asset ratio are insignificant. 
 
6.  Post-merger Performance 
                                                  
1  As for the definition of the Japanese business group, diversified groups consisting 
of a bank and a range of large manufacturing firms that cross-share stocks and 
often accept directors from the bank is defined as keiretsu (e.g., Hoshi et al., 1990), 
Keiretsu has sometimes another meaning of a vertical grouping of manufacturing 
firms. Our definition does not necessarily imply such a bank-centered group or a 
vertical tie. 8 
 
6.1 Approach 
To examine the effects of mergers, we have to avoid the endogeneity problem of 
the merger decision. To this aim, we adopt the propensity score matching method. 
First, based on the result of Table 3, we select a control sample using the one-to-one 
nearest matching. Second, we estimate the effects of mergers on the acquirer’s TFP 
and R&D for up to three years after merger using the following 
difference-in-difference approach: 
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1 1 1 1
1 1 ˆ α (2),      
s  =   {   1 ,   2 ,   3 } ,                                                     
 
, where n is the number of observations, i.e., acquirers.   
Though  ATT α ˆ   is an appropriate measure of the effects of mergers, it contains 
some impacts of acquired firms at least in the short run. For example, if the 
performance of the acquired firm was bad before mergers, it may take a 
considerable time to integrate the business in an efficient way. In this case,,  ATT α ˆ  
shows a negative effect of the merger, even if the merger has synergy effects in the 
long run. To eliminate the short-run impact of the acquired firm, we  measure 
changes in TFP and R&D intensity from one year after mergers: 






s year n acquisitio
treated




1 1 1 1
1 1 ˆ β       ( 3 )   
    
6.2 Baseline Results 
 
Table 4A presents the estimates of  ATT α ˆ , changes from the pre-merger level. It 
shows that TFP decreases significantly just after mergers and does not recover to 
the pre-merger level up to three years after mergers. On the other hand, R&D 
intensity does not show a significant decrease up to three years after mergers. The 
increased leverage after mergers does not significantly constrain R&D. A decrease 
in TFP may suggest that some managerial costs of business integration are required 
to acquire firms. A temporary decrease in ROA, which is negative and significant 
one year after mergers, also suggests some managerial costs of integration.   
Table 4B presents the estimates of  ATT β ˆ , changes from one year after mergers. 
It shows that the change in TFP is not significant. Scale or scope economy is not 
working at least up to three years after mergers. The change in the R&D intensity 
is not significant, either. Yeh and Hoshino (2002), who examined the productivity of 9 
 
merging firms who completed mergers from 1970 to 1995, also found no significant 
recovery in the post-merger years (Table 4, pp. 355), despite the differences in 
control samples (industry medians in Yeh and Hoshino (2002) vs. the propensity 
score matching in this paper) and the sample period. 
What do the results concerning the post-merger performance suggest concerning 
the hypotheses in Section 2. First, we cannot judge the validity of the 
value-enhancing hypothesis only from our results concerning the post-merger 
productivity of the acquiring firm. Even though the acquiring firm’s productivity 
decreases due to the integration costs, the merger can enhance the acquiring firm’s 
value if the productivity of the acquired assets increases significantly and it more 
than compensates the integration costs. However, we can observe only the acquiring 
firm’s productivity here. Second, our result suggests that a financial constraint 
effect on R&D is not significant, though the firm leverage significantly increases. 
Finally, our results are not consistent with the managerial private motive 
hypothesis. Though the post-merger TFP is lower than its pre-merger level, it does 
not decrease further after mergers. This hypothesis is not consistent with the 
evidence concerning the pre-merger characteristics that a more productive firm is 
more likely to be an acquirer (Table 3).2  
 
6.3 Results by Merger Type 
 
     The post-merger performance may depend on various merger types: whether 
merging firms are within the same industry or across different industries, or 
whether merging firms are within the same business group or not. For example, 
within-industry mergers may be easier to save the duplication of R&D investment. 
Efficiency improvement through synergy effects may also be different between 
within-industry mergers and across industry mergers. Merging firms within a 
business group may share sufficient information on each other and unambiguous 
power balance between the acquiring and acquired firms, which may contribute to 
the reduction in the conflicts of interests and integration costs.   
Table 5A shows the post-merger performance of mergers for the within-industry 
and across-industry mergers. Looking at the changes from one-year post-merger, we 
                                                  
2  The managerial private motive hypothesis is not consistent, either with Hosono et 
al., (2004), who examined the Japanese manufacturing firms and showed that R&D 
tended to increase the firm value in the latter half of the 1990s, against the view 
that R&D is a managerial perquisite. 10 
 
see that a significant recovery of TFP after mergers can be observed only for 
across-industry mergers. ROA also increases during the two years beginning from 
one-year post-merger in the case of across-industry mergers. Synergy effects seem 
to be significant for across-industry mergers. The changes in R&D are not 
significant either for within-industry mergers or for across-industry mergers. 
As the preceding studies suggest, the post-merger may also depend on whether 
merging firms are affiliated with a business group or not. A firm affiliated with a 
business group may tend to bailout financially distressed firms within the group, 
and hence its post-merger productivity may be negatively affected by the merger 
(Yeh and Hoshino, 2002). On the other hand, pre-merger information sharing and 
clear power balance within a business group may help improve post-merger 
efficiency (Iwaki, 2006).   
  Table 5B shows the post-merger performance of mergers for the within-group 
mergers and non-within-group mergers. The recovery of TFP after mergers is 
significant only for within-group mergers. This is consistent with Iwaki (2006), 
suggesting that the integration costs are relatively small in the case of mergers 
within a business group.  The changes in R&D intensity are insignificant for both 
types of mergers. The change of debt-to-asset ratio from the one-year pre-merger is 
negative and significant only for within-group, which may suggest that merges are 
undertaken to bailout a financially distressed firm within the same group. However, 
a financial constraint effect on R&D investment cannot be observed. 
 
7.  Pre-merger characteristics, Merger Type, and Post-merger performance 
7.1 Approach 
Given the heterogeneity of mergers, pre-merger characteristics of a acquirer 
and merger type may have impacts on its post-merger performance. To investigate 
this possibility, we first measure the effects of mergers on TFP and R&D intensity 
as 








year acqusition t i y y y y y 1 1 3 3 3 , − − + + + − − − ≡ Δ     (3), 
, where  y  denotes either TFP or R&D intensity. Note that we adopt a four-year 
window. Next, we regress the change in TFP or R&D intensity on the pre-merger 
characteristics of the acquirer. 
  t i i t i t i Type X y , 2 1 , 1 3 , ' ' ε β β + + = Δ − +                                      ( 4 ) ,  
 where  1 , − t i X  is the vector of the pre-merger characteristics of the acquirer  i and 11 
 
i Type  is the vector of merger types.  1 , − t i X includes the TFP level, ROA, R&D 
intensity, debt-to-asset ratio, and the average age of the industry the acquirer 
belongs to. We try to capture the maturity of the industry by the industry-level age. 
If the free cash flow hypothesis is valid, mergers in matured industries do not 
improve TFP.  i Type   consists of the two variables. One is the intra-industry merger 
dummy and the other is the within-group dummy that takes unity if the acquiring 
and acquired firms are affiliated to the same business group. 
 
7.2 Results 
The first two columns of Table 6 show the estimation results of TFP and the last 
two columns show those of R&D intensity. 
Looking at the results of TFP, we find that the initial R&D intensity has a 
positive and marginally significant effect on the change in TFP. The finding that 
mergers by an R&D intensive acquirer are likely to improve its TFP is consistent 
with the value maximization hypothesis. The initial TFP have negative impacts on 
the change in TFP, suggesting its mean reverting property. The industry-level age is 
not significant. Column 1, with only the intra-industry dummy and the group 
dummy shows that neither of the merger type dummies is significant. In Column 2, 
we classify mergers into four types: within-industry and within-group (type A), 
within-industry and non-within-group (type B), across-industry and within-group 
(type C), and across-industry and non-within-group (type D). Given type D as a 
benchmark, all the other three type dummies are positive and significant with 
almost the same coefficients, suggesting that type D underperforms the other three 
types in terms of TFP. Type D may involve quite a high managerial cost for business 
integration. 
Turning to the results of R&D intensity, we find that the initial R&D intensity is 
negative and significant, suggesting its mean reverting movement. The 
debt-to-asset ratio is not significant. If mergers tightened the financial constraint 
faced by the acquirer, such effects would be stronger for the acquirers whose 
pre-merger debt level was high. Our result suggests that the financial constraint 
does not have a negative impact on the post-merger R&D intensity.  The 
industry-level age dummy is positive but not significant. The managerial private 
motive hypothesis is unwarranted. Column 3, including two merger types of 
dummies, the intra-industry dummy and the group dummy, shows that the group 12 
 
dummy is negative and significant at the 10 percent level. The finding that 
within-group mergers reduce R&D intensity but not TFP level suggests that firms 
within a group may have substitutable technology and therefore acquirers can save 
duplication of R&D within-groups, though this effect is only marginally significant. 
In column 4, we include four merger type dummies and find that none of the merger 
type dummies is significant.   
 
8.  Conclusion 
  
We investigate the impact of merger on innovation and efficiency using a 
micro dataset of Japanese manufacturing firms including unlisted firms during the 
period of 1995-1999. We find that the acquirer’s total factor productivity (TFP) 
decreases immediately after mergers and does not significantly recover to the 
pre-merger level within three years after mergers. We also find that the R&D 
intensity does not significantly change after mergers in spite of a significant 
increase in the debt-to-asset ratio. Our results suggest that the costs of business 
integration are large and persistent.   
Considering a large integration cost, we also analyze the post-merger 
performance from one year after mergers, finding no significant increase in TFP or 
R&D intensity up to three years after mergers.   
Given the heterogeneity of mergers, we analyze the post-merger performance 
by classifying merger types. We find that the recovery of TFP after mergers is 
significant for mergers across industries or within the same business group, 
suggesting that a synergy effect works well and integration costs are small for those 
types of mergers   
Though our sample is broad in that it includes both listed and non-listed firms, 
our sample period, fiscal year 1995 to1999, is relatively short, which coincides with 
the severe banking crisis in Japan and a major part of which covers the downturn of 
business cycle (1997:II through 1999:I), mainly due to the limited availability of 
dataset. Would the results change if we could extend the sample period to cover a 
more “normal” period? We conjecture that our results that mergers within a group 
or across industries relatively perform better than other types would still hold. On 
the other hand, the overall post-merger performance might depend on how many 
mergers are for the purpose of rescuing distressed firms and how many are for more 
strategic business purposes. The exact answer to the question has to be waited until 
more recent data become available. 13 
 
Appendix: Construction of the TFP measure   
  The dataset employed in this paper was obtained from Basic Survey of Japanese 
Business Structure and Activities for the period from 1994-2002, which is conducted 
annually by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). 
We define the productivity level of firm i in year t in a certain industry in 
comparison with the productivity level of a hypothetical representative firm in base 
year 0 in that industry. This TFP measure was developed by Caves, Christensen, 
and Diewert (1982) and extended by Good, Nadiri, Roller, and Sickles (1983).   
  The TFP level is defined as follows: 
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where Qi, t, Sf, i, t, and Xf, i, t denote the output of firm i in year t, the cost share of 
factor f for firm i in year t, and firm i’s input of factor f in year t, respectively. 
Variables with an upper bar denote the industry average of that variable.   
We drop from our sample all firms for which data on total sales, total number of 
workers, tangible fixed assets, total wages and intermediate inputs are zero or 
negative value at least for one year. If firm i switches industries, we classify firm i 
into an industry by entry date. 
 
Output 
Except for the commerce sector, gross output is defined as firms’ total sales. For the 
commerce sector, gross output is measured as sales minus expenses for purchased 




For the commerce sector, intermediate inputs are calculated as (Cost of sales + 
Operating costs) – (Wages + Depreciation costs + Expenses for purchased materials). 
The intermediate inputs of other sectors are defined as (Cost of sales + Operating 
costs) – (Wages + Depreciation costs). Intermediate inputs are deflated by the 




As labor input, we used each firm’s total number of workers multiplied by the 
sectoral working hours from the JIP 2006.   
 
Capital Stock 
For capital stock, the only data available are the nominal book values of tangible 
fixed assets. Using these data, we calculated the net capital stock of firm i in 
industry j in constant 1995 prices as follows: 
) / ( jt jt it it IBV INK BV K ∗ =  
where BVit represents the book value of firm i’s tangible fixed capital in year t, INKjt 
stands for the net capital stock of industry j in constant 1995 prices, and IBVjt 
denotes the book value of industry j’s capital. INKjt was calculated as follows. First, 
as a benchmark, we took the data on the book value of tangible fixed assets in 1975 
from the Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations published by MOF. We 
then converted the book value of year 1975 into the real value in constant 1995 
prices using the investment deflator provided in the JIP 2006. Second, the net 
capital stock of industry j,  INKjt, for succeeding years was calculated using the 
perpetual inventory method. We used the investment deflator in the JIP 2006. The 
sectoral depreciation rate used is taken from the JIP 2006. 
 
Cost Shares 
Total cost of labor is measured as total wages. We used nominal intermediate input 
as the intermediate input cost. Capital cost was calculated by multiplying the real 
net capital stock with the user cost of capital. The latter was estimated as follows:   
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where  λ δ , , , , u i pk  and z  are the price of investment goods, the interest rate, the 
depreciation rate, the corporate tax rate, the equity ratio, and the present value of 
depreciation deduction on a unit of nominal investment, respectively. Data on 
investment goods prices, interest rates, and corporate tax rates were taken from the 
JIP 2006, the Bank of Japan’s website, and the Ministry of Finance Statistics 
Monthly, respectively. The depreciation rate for each sector ( i δ ) was taken from the 
JIP 2006. We calculated the cost shares of each factor by dividing the cost of each 15 
 
factor by total costs, which consist of the sum of labor costs, intermediate inputs 
costs, and capital costs.  z   was estimated as follows: 
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Table 1. Hypotheses of the Characteristics and Performance of Acquirers
Motives Pre-merger Characteristics Post-Merger Performance
TFP R&D Change in TFP Change in R&D
Value-Creation High - Increase Increase 
 (Synergy) (Complementary)
Decrease Decrease 
 (Integration Costs) (Substitutable)
Managerial Private Motive Low High Decrease Increase 
(Empire-Building) (Empire-Building)
Increase Decrease 
(Discipline by Debt) (Discipline by Debt)














B. By Industry of Acquirers
Food products and beverages 10
Textiles 4
Pulp ,paper and paper products 2
Chemicals 17
Petroleum and coal products 1
Non-metallic mineral products 9
Iron, steel,  and non-ferrous metals 19
Fabricated metal products 11
Machinery 19






Within Group Others Total
Within Industry 68 11 79
Across Industries 59 2 61
Total 127 13 140  20 
 
Table 3. Decision of Being an Acquirer
TFP 0.736 *
(1.71)
Cash Flow / Asset -0.395 ***
(-4.24)




R&D / Sales -1.463
(-0.62)
Cost / Asset 0.176 ***
(3.16)




No. of Obs. 62072
Pseudo R2  0.095
1 Logit estimate for the probability of being an acquirer is presented.
2. All the explanatory variables are one-year lagged variables.
   Year dummies and industry dummies are included in the explanatory variables.
3. Numbers in the parentheses are z-values.
4. ***, **, * stand for the significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  21 
 
Table 4. Post-merger Performance
A. Changes from one year before mergers





1 year -0.025 *** -0.001 -0.009 ** 0.012 *
(214) (214) (214) (214)
2 years -0.026 *** 0.000 -0.007 0.014 *
(199) (199) (199) (199)
3 years -0.031 *** -0.002 -0.005 0.032 **
(140) (140) (140) (140)
B. Changes from one year after mergers





2 years -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.001
(183) (183) (183) (183)
3 years 0.011 -0.003 0.002 0.003
(122) (122) (122) (122)
1. Changes from one year after mergers are shown.
2. Numbers in the parentheses are numbers of observations.
3. ***, **, * stand for the significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table 5. Post-merger Performance by Merger Type







from (t-1) to (t+3) -0.037 *** -0.002 -0.015 ** 0.037 **
(79) (79) (79) (79)
from (t+1) to (t+3) 0.001 -0.003 -0.006 0.011







from (t-1) to (t+3) -0.024 -0.002 0.007 0.025
(61) (61) (61) (61)
from (t+1) to (t+3) 0.024 ** -0.004 0.011 * -0.007
(54) (54) (54) (54)







from (t-1) to (t+3) -0.027 ** -0.002 -0.003 0.031 **
(127) (127) (127) (127)
from (t+1) to (t+3) 0.017 * -0.003 0.003 0.006







from (t-1) to (t+3) -0.075 * 0.002 -0.026 * 0.046
(13) (13) (13) (13)
from (t+1) to (t+3) -0.035 -0.002 -0.010 -0.031
(12) (12) (12) (12)
1. Year t denotes the merger year.
2. Changes from one year after mergers are shown.
3. Numbers in the parentheses are numbers of observations.
4. ***, **, * stand for the significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table 6. Pre-merger Characteristics and Post-merger Performance
Dependent Variable TFP  TFP  R&D intensity R&D intensity
C o l u m n   N o . 1234
TFP level -0.678 *** -0.705 ***
(-8.69) (-9.05)
ROA 0.293 0.328 -0.028 -0.027
(1.28) (1.46) (-1.06) (-1.03)
R&D intensity 0.780 * 0.775 * -0.755 *** -0.756 ***
(1.85) (1.87) (-14.90) (-14.89)
Debt-to-asset ratio -0.019 -0.015 -0.003 -0.003
(-0.43) (-0.35) (-0.64) (-0.60)
Intra-industry dummy -0.002 -0.003
(-0.07) (-1.19)
Group dummy 0.029 -0.008 *
(0.73) (-1.66)
TypeA dummy 0.190 ** -0.004
(within-industry and within-group dummy) (2.11) (-0.35)
TypeB dummy 0.202 ** 0.006
(within-industry and non-within-group dummy) (2.07) (0.49)
TypeC dummy 0.204 ** 0.000
(across-industry and within-group dummy) (2.26) (0.00)
TypeD dummy (dropped) (dropped)
(across-industry and non-within-group dummy)
Industry-level age 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.50) (0.61) (1.47) (1.49)
Constant -0.114 -0.294 ** -0.013 -0.021
(-0.94) (-2.01) (-0.91) (-1.20)
Obs.
R-squared 
1 Dependent variables are changes from one year before mergers to three years after mergers. 
2. All the explanatory variables are one-year before mergers.
3. Numbers in the parentheses are t-values.
128 128 128 128





                                                  
１  Iwaki (2007) excludes the so-called “equal mergers” from her sample firms. 